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WORKMEN'S-COMPENSATION: THIRD PARTY ACTIONS AND THE,
APPORTIONMENT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES*
JA s B. ATLESON**
W EN an employee is injured in an accident which "arises out of and in the
course of" his employment, the laws of all states provide a system of stat-
utory compensation. The employee can recover from the employer, or from a
statutory fund created by employer contributions, if the statutory conditions
are met, despite the employer's lack of fault. In return for statutory benefits,
the worker normally surrenders all rights and remedies which he would
otherwise have against his employer as a result of the injury.1
A compensable injury under workmen's compensation laws may have been
caused by the negligence of someone other than the employer. Although the
acts of the third person may have been the proximate cause of the injury, the
injury could nevertheless have "arisen out of and in the course of employment." 2
All of the American compensation systems recognize that the worker may have
a common law tort action against the third person whose negligence or wrong-
ful conduct has been the proximate cause of his injuries.3
In all but two states, once the employer has paid or become liable to pay
compensation benefits to a worker who has been injured under circumstances
giving rise to common law liability on the part of some third person, the em-
ployer has a right to share in any recovery by the worker against the tortfeasor.
Reimbursement may be achieved either by assigning the worker's cause of ac-
tion to the employer or by subrogating the employer to the worker's claim.4
Furthermore, in most states, if the employer pursues the action against the
third person, recovery is not limited to the amount of compensation paid
or payable by him. The employer or insurer can normally recover the third
party's full liability to the employee; any amount received in excess of the
*This article was suggested in part by a study made by the author for the New York
State Law Revision Commission, as yet unconsidered by the Commission and unpublished.
The views expressed herein are not in any sense to be taken as indicating the views or
determinations of the Law Revision Commission.
** BA., Ohio State University, 1960; J). 1962; LL.M., Stanford University, 1964;
Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo.
1. See N.Y. WoRaxNa's Com. LAw § 11 (McKinney 1965). An exception is some-
times made for the employer subject to the act who fails to comply with an obligation to
insure. The worker often has the alternative of a common law action without the defenses
of contributory negligence, fellow servant doctrine and an assumption of risk.
2. See Bohlen, A Problem in the Drafting of Workmen's Compensation Acts, 25
HARV. L. REV. 517, 526-30 (1912). See also A. LARSON, WoRKz='S COiENSATION LAW§§ 6.40, 7.00 [hereinafter cited as LAXSON].
3. In most states this is recognized by the compensation statute itself; in Ohio and
West Virginia it is a judicial gloss on the compensation acts. See infra notes 42, 48.
4. The words "employer" and "insurer" are used interchangeably in this study. In
some states an employer may join the state insurance fund, may insure with a private
carrier, or may self insure. Some states permit only one method of insurance, others permit
two of the three varieties. Since the employer may or may not be "the insurer" in fact, I
have given the two words the same meaning.
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benefits plus reasonable costs of recovery is payable to the worker or his repre-
sentatives. 5
When the employee pursues his common law right of action in states such
as New York, he must bear the total expense of attorney's fees. These
fees are a prior lien on the third party recovery, and the insurer or employer has
a secondary lien for his statutory compensation liability. Many feel it is in-
equitable for the employee to bear the total cost of attorney's fees, since the
employee's action has obtained a recovery for the insurer. This question is the
focus of this article.
In analyzing the wisdom and necessity of allocating attorney's fees, the
article is organized as follows: The first section discusses the theory of work-
men's compensation as a system of social insurance, especially as related to
third party actions. The second section details the mechanics of subrogation
in the various jurisdictions in order to gain a background for the narrower
question of apportionment of attorney's fees. The third section describes the
statutory provisions dealing with attorney's fees. The state provisions deal-
ing with apportionment of attorney's fees or reduction of the insurer's lien are
functionally analyzed, and the New York procedure is detailed. The final por-
tion of the article presents a discussion and an analysis of the apportionment
question, leading to a recommendation for modifying New York law.
TaRD PARTY ACTIONS AND THE THEORY OF WORXM.N'S COMIPENSATION
Workmen's compensation laws are the result of the movement to replace
common law negligence remedies with a concept of industrial or enterprise
liability under a form of compulsory insurance." The employee's common law
right of action for negligence against his employer is traded for a statutory
benefit system which theoretically provides faster, more certain benefits, and
which dispenses with the necessity of having to prove fault. Further, common
law defenses such as contributory negligence are irrelevant to the statutory
scheme.
The concept of industrial liability seems to fit neatly into the problem of
industrial injuries. Losses due to accidents can be readily deemed a cost of
production of goods or distribution of services which should be paid by the
enterprise or those who benefit from its operation. It is assumed that the costs
of accidents initially borne by the enterprise will be passed on to the con-
sumer in the form of higher prices. More important, perhaps, is the assumption
that most injuries will not be attributable to fault on the part of the employer.7
5. But see CoLO. REv. STAT. Awm. § 81-13-8 (1963) wherein the insurer may only
recover the amount of its statutory liability.
6. See McCoid, The Third Person in a Compensation Picture: A Study of the Liabil-
ities and Rights of Non-Employers, 37 TExAs L. REV. 389, 396-97 (1959). See generally
A. EmEENZWEIG, NEGLIGENCE WiTHOUT FAULT (1951); 2 F. IItwmR AND F. JAMES, TE
LAW OF TORTS, chs. 12-13 (1956); W. PROSSER, TORTS, 14-16, 19-20 (2d ed. 1955).
7. This oft-asserted theory stems from the German social insurance system, but it is
unclear whether it has had any real effect upon the development of workmen's compensation
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Why, then, should the employee's cause of action against a negligent third
party remain? Professor McCoid lists three reasons for the retention of rights
against third parties despite the general acceptance of the enterprise liability con-
cept.8 First, it is arguable that the risk of accident through the intervention of a
stranger to the employment relation is not a normal or inherent risk of employ-
ment.9 In theory, a certain incidence of injury or accidents appear to be typ-
ical or unavoidable, and subsequent expenses should be treated as one of the
costs of production of goods and services to be assumed by the enterprise and
those who benefit just as the cost and repair of machines or materials used is
borne by the enterprise and the consumer.10 Although the insurer bears the
cost of compensation liability initially, third party actions permit him to re-
coup his statutory outlay.
Second, tort theory as well as the concept of enterprise liability conclude
that compensation should be provided at the least cost to society and that the
enterprise is a better risk-distributor or bearer than the injured employee. Yet,
the third person, responsible for the employee's injuries under common law
negligence principles, may not necessarily be a poor risk bearer. Indeed, the
third person may often be an enterprise. Thus, the third person may be
a relatively good risk bearer or distributor as compared with the injured
person. Even if the third person is also an employee, he may possess a greater
ability to bear the risk since his earning capacity may not have been impaired.
A primary objective of both tort and workmen's compensation law should
be to prevent accidents as well as to provide compensation for injuries. To
impose some sort of liability on third persons may achieve some of the same
desirable effects as the imposition of strict liability on enterprises which have
the ability to prevent accidents." The possibility of encouraging even third
persons who are individuals to take greater care should not be ignored.
The most persuasive argument in favor of retaining some opportunity for
recovery against third persons, however, is more practical and obvious. Since
compensation acts are designed to protect the worker and his family, this
objective is furthered by the retention of any and all rights not directly incon-
sistent with the basic compensation scheme. 2 The benefits provided by exist-
ing compensation acts are not expected to be full payment for all losses suffered.
law in the United States. Like many areas in American life, we have been much too busy
with day-to-day practical problems to be overly concerned with theory. See Witte, The
Theory of Workmen's Compensation, 20 Am. LAB. LEG. REv. 411 (1930).
8. See McCoid, supra note 6, at 395-403.
9. Id. at 398-99.
10. See J. BoYD, Tan LAW Or ComPENSATION FOR INJURIES TO WORKMEN 10 (1913);
H. Sommas AND A. SomRS, WoRax.EN's COMENSATION 26 (1954). See also Witte, Supra
note 7. Professor Witte asserts that the employer, not the consumer or the industry as a
whole, bears the burden of compensation in many cases. He argues that the better rationale
is that the compensation law applies a means of sharing the burden between the employer
and the employees with the "least social cost." See alsa W. PROSsER, TORTS 383 (2d ed.
1955).
11. See 2 F. HARPER AN F. JA.ni., supra note 6, at §§ 11.4(3), 12.4(3).
12. See McCoid, supra note 6, at 401.
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Thus, no recovery is allowed for pain and suffering, and disfigurement and
other isjuries which do not affect earning capacity are generally not compen-
sated.13 Most important, the bulk of compensation benefits are determined on
the percentage of loss of earning capacity which the worker has suffered. "A
compensation system, unlike tort recovery, does not pretend to restore to the
claimant what he has lost; it gives him a sum which, added to his remaining
earning ability, if any, will presumably enable him to exist without being a
burden to others."' 4 Thus, compensation acts provide only a percentage of the
loss of earning capacity. Many statutes limit the amount that can be received
in any week. Where disability is partial or temporary, the benefits are further
restricted by stipulating a maximum number of weeks in which benefits may
be paid. The amount of compensation to which an injured employee is en-
titled depends on the "benefit rate," usually a percentage of weekly wages
ranging in various states from 50-80 percent.15 This amount is normally lim-
ited in two ways. First, most states impose a maximum weekly payment.
Second, a maximum total compensation is often imposed.10
A study of compensation cases in Illinois, with a fairly liberal set of bene-
fits, indicates that only twelve to fifty percent of actual wage loss is covered
by compensation benefits.17 In the nation as a whole the estimate has been
made that workers recover at best only one-third of the total economic loss
to them resulting from industrial accidents.' 8  Survivor's benefits are
even less successful in loss replacement. Estimates of the percentage of loss
replaced by death benefits range from as little as twelve percent to a high of
70 percent, while New York replaces only slightly more than one-third of the
loss resulting from a worker's death. 19 Although medical benefits are not lim-
ited in New York, funeral expenses are limited to 400 dollars.20
A brief sketch of New York's statutory benefits will illustrate this point.
Most injuries cause "temporary and total" incapacity, that is, complete inabil-
ity to perform any work for a relatively short period of time. This disability
must last a minimum of seven days, and no benefits are allowed for the first
seven days of disability unless the disability extends beyond fourteen days.2 '
New York provides a recovery of two-thirds of the average weekly wage,
13. Although New York's statute does not require the showing of a relationship
between disfigurement and earning power, the courts have recognized that disfigurement
does impair a worker's earning capacity. N.Y. Woax~m 's Cowr. LAW § 15(3)(t) (Mc-
Kinney 1965).
14. LARSoN, at 10.
15. H. Somms Am A. SomEns, supra note 10, at 64-65, Table MI-B.
16. See U.S. BuEAu op LABOR STuAanms, BuLL. No. 161, STATE WoRxrN's Com-
PENSATION LAWS 19 (1955).
17. Division of Statistics and Research, Illinois Dept. of Labor, ANN. Rir. oN Cou-
PENsABLE WoRx Irimyu 111 (1956).
18. H. SomEas AND A. Soms, supra note 10, at 12, 81.
19. E. CHErT, IjimY AN REcovwR iN THE CouasE oF EMLOYMENT 104-05, Table
4.5, 144 (1961).
20. See generally S. HoRoVn'z, INjURY AND DEAra UNDER WORK=NE ' COMPENsATION
LAws 311 (Wright and Potter, ed. 1944).
21. N.Y. WORKMEN'S COiw. LAW § 12 (McKinney 1965).
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but limits benefits to 85 dollars a week.22 Thus, an employee who earns an
average weekly wage of 150 dollars recovers only 56 percent of that- amount
due to the weekly ceiling. Although one-fourth of compensation acts provide
for a supplementary allowance for workers with dependents, New York law
does not.23
A small percentage of injuries result in "permanent and total" disability,
that is, disability resulting in a complete loss of wage earning capacity for
life. The benefits, rates and weekly maximums are generally the same as those
set for temporary and total disability.24 Recent amendments in New York,
however, limit benefits to 70 dollars a week.2 5 A further difference exists in
the duration of payments. Approximately two-thirds of the jurisdictions pay
benefits for the duration of disability, while the remainder limit the length of
the compensable period. 26 New York provides that benefits be paid for the
duration of the disability 27
"Permanent and partial" disability benefits are paid when an employee
suffers a lifelong functional or anatomical loss which does not result in total
loss of earning capacity. These compensable injuries fall into two general cat-
egories: schedule or non-schedule. Scheduled disabilities result from the loss of
a member of the body, such as an arm or leg. The schedule provides for a
stated number of weeks of compensation for a given injury without proof of
loss of earning capacity. The range of scheduled benefits varies greatly among
various jurisdictions, and little consistency exists. 28 In New York, the schedule
provides, for instance, for 312 weeks of compensation for the loss of an arm.
Again, benefits are two-thirds of the average weekly wage and 'a weekly max-
imum of 70 dollars is imposed.29  Non-scheduled injuries are compensated at
two-thirds of the difference between the average weekly wage before injury
and the employee's wage earning capacity thereafter.3 0
The above sketch demonstrates that not only do benefits represent only
a fraction of the actual loss of earning capacity, but they are hardly adequate
under any standard. Furthermore, loss of earning capacity is only one of the
elements of damage which would be compensable under a common law negli-
gence action.
To make such benefits the worker's sole remedy when another responsi-
22. N.Y. WORxMXN'S Com. LAW § 15(5), (6-a) (McKinney 1965). In 1966, the
legislature repealed provisions setting an upper limit of $6,500 for temporary and total
disability and $5,500 for temporary and partial disability. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1966, ch. 161,
§§ 1, 2.
23. McCamman and Skolnik, Workmen's Compensation: Measures of Accomplishment,
17 SocIA SEcuaiTy Bu=L. No. 3, p. 7 (1954).
24. H. Sommas AND A. SOmERs, s-upra note 10, at 69.
25. N.Y. WoRaxix's CoM. LAW § 19(6-a) (McKinney 1965).
26. E. CHE=T, supra note 19, at 168-69, Table 6.3-6.4.
27. N.Y. WoRxnms's Coiv. LAW § 15(1), (6-a) (McKinney 1965).
28. For astounding variations see E. CH=Tr, supra note 19, at 163, 167.
29. N.Y. WoRMUN's Coio. LAW § 15(3), (6-a) (McKinney 1965).
30. N.Y. Woax=N's Coan. LAw § 15(3) (v) (McKinney 1965); for "temporary and
partial" injuries, see § 15(5).
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ble party may be available to bear some of the burden would defeat the objec-
tive of protecting the worker and his family against destitution and want.
Indeed, to deny the remedy may go further and increase the burden upon the
public as a whole where the compensation benefits are in fact inadequate to
care for the worker and his family. In this situation, the employee and his
family might become dependent upon public assistance.
Thus, the practicalities of workmen's compensation statutes call for the
retention of common law rights against negligent third parties. As the law of
every state attests, the limitation of statutory benefits calls for third party
actions despite objections stemming from enterprise theories.
More important for purposes of this study, the above catalog of benefits
demonstrates that the cost of industrial injuries is shared by the employee and
industry. The employee absorbs a substantial portion of his loss. This sharing
of the burden, although rarely referred to, is as old as workmen's compensation
laws in the United States. It is sometimes justified as being consistent with the
Puritan Ethic: the statutory benefits should encourage employees to go back
to work and thereby discourage malingering. Without challenging this concept,
it should be clear that it does not explain the limitations on "permanent and
total" disability, or even "permanent and partial" disability. Schedule losses
are limited to a maximum number of weeks despite the great possibility that
the worker's earning capacity may have been reduced for life. A reply would
no doubt concern costs and the burden on industry and the fear of the states
that generous benefits will place them in a disadvantaged competitive position.
Although benefits may be justifiably restricted, it is important to note,
again, that these limitations argue for third party actions, and, indeed, en-
courage workers to pursue their common law remedy. Although the cost of
industrial accidents is borne by the employee and the employer, they do not
share in the expenses of a third party action. If the employee sues, he pays
the entire cost of attorney's fees and, indeed, the employer recoups his stat-
utory expenses from the recovery ahead of the employee.
Tnx MECHANICS OF THID PARTY ACTIONS: AN OVERVIEW
In most jurisdictions the employee may sue under the common law and
also pursue his compensation claim, subject to the condition that he may not
retain both recoveries. Normally, the employee's right to sue will be assigned
to the insurer if the employee fails to sue within a specific period of time.8 1
Thus, most states have decided that the common law action against the third
party is not an inconsistent remedy.32
In some states, for example, Massachusetts and Maryland, the acceptance
of compensation gives the insurer a prior right to sue. If an employee in Mas-
31. See LARsox, § 73, at 190.
32. See, e.g., Martin v. C. A. Prod. Co., 9 A.D.2d 550, 189 N.Y.S.2d 528 (3d Dep't
Mer. 1959).
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sachusetts claims or receives compensation within one year of the injury, and
the insurer does not begin a third party action within fifteen months after the in-
jury, the employee may sue. Therefore, in the event that the employer does not
bring an action, the employee may in fact bring an action at law and file for
workmen's compensation claims. However, an initial action at law forecloses a
claim under the workmen's compensation act. The act, then, encourages the
employee to seek statutory benefits under the workmen's compensation act
first.3 3 The insurer, on the other hand, has a great incentive to pursue his as-
signed cause of action against the third party. The insurer has the initial right
to bring the action, and, if he does, only four-fifths of any excess is paid to
the employee. On the other hand, if the employee brings the action he retains
the entire excess. Thus, as in New York, the insurer is encouraged to bring an
action and settle for more than the amount of its lien since it may keep a por-
tion of the excess.
In a small number of states, however, an employee is required to elect
whether he will pursue his negligence claim or request statutory benefits. Nor-
mally, the election doctrine works both ways: recourse to either avenue of
relief bars recourse to the other. In Texas, although a third party action bars
a compensation claim, a prior compensation claim will not necessarily bar a
later third party suit. If compensation is claimed under workmen's compen-
sation, then the insurer may bring an action against a third party. There is no
provision for the cause of action to return to the employee after a certain
amount of time. The right of the employee to sue, however, has apparently
been read into the act by the courts.3 5 On the other hand, when the employee
first starts an action at law, he forecloses any right to bring a claim under
workmen's compensation.36
A number of states require an election, providing that an election to take
compensation assigns the cause of action to the insurer. Harshness is reduced
by permitting the employee to recover from the insurer any amount by which
his third party recovery is less than the statutory benefits.37
33. The statute is designed to protect the insurer's interest if the employee should
choose to seek statutory compensation. Furlong v. Cronan, 305 Mass. 464, 26 N.E.2d 382(1940). See also, Reidy v. Old Colony Gas Co., 315 Mass. 631, 53 N.E.2d 707 (1944). This
kind of provision raises all the typical common law questions which arise whenever an
election of remedies rule is applied, such as, what indeed constitutes an election, who may
make an election, the effect of discontinuing an action by an employee, and so on. MAss.
GEN. LAWS AwN. ch. 152, § 15 (1958), annot. 3-6, pp. 448-51.
34. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Fish, 276 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
35. See Zurich Ins. Co. v. Reider, 324 S.W.2d 428 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).36. Hart v. Traders and General Ins. Co., 185 S.W.2d 605 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945),
aff'd, 144 Tex. 146, 189 S.W.2d 493 (1945). Oddly, however, the employer's right of
recovery against the third party is limited to damages in excess of the workmen's compensa-
tion benefits received by the employee. Dallas Ry. and Terminal Co. v. Hendrix, 261 S.W.2d
610 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953); Hartford Accident and Indem. Co. v. Weeks Drug Store, 161
S.W.2d 153 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942). This means that the third party does not pay the total
amount of damages stemming from his negligence.
37. See Mum. STAT. Aw-. § 176.061(5) (1966); CoLo. RV. STAT. ANN. § 81-13-8(1963); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 51.24.010 (1962). Minnesota permits the employee to
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The risks involved in the application of strict election doctrines is out of
place in modern social welfare legislation, and the doctrine has been vigorously
criticized.3 8 There is no danger of double recovery because the employer or
insurer is reimbursed out of the proceeds of the third party recovery. Further-
more, the employee cannot be said to be asserting two inconsistent rights,
alleging contrary facts, or seeking inconsistent remedies.
With the exception of the few "election of remedy" states, then, the in-
jured employee may generally file his compensation claim and also pursue his
common law tort claim.3 9 The employer is generally given the right to share
in the worker's cause of action against the third person. Most states per-
mit a lien on the proceeds of the third party action or actually assign the
employee's cause of action to the employer. Most states provide that the
employer shall have a lien on any recovery which the worker may obtain in
the amount of the compensation benefits paid to or for the worker.
Three objectives are thought to be achieved by a statutory subrogation
procedure.40 First, there is an oft-expressed feeling that the employee should
not retain both damages and compensation for the same injury.41 Such an
approach necessarily rejects the analogy of benefits to payments under acci-
dent insurance policies. This analogy is employed, however, by the few states
which permit the retention of benefits and full damages from the third party.42
Second, the employer who has satisfied his statutory obligation should be
entitled to reimbursement from the negligent third party for the loss he has
been obliged to suffer.43 This objective, however, is far from persuasive. Such
indemnity, it should be noted, permits the enterprise to shift the accident cost
to the third party.44 Ironically, many third party actions are brought against
a third party responsible only under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Thus,
two no-fault principles collide. Finally, the employer may have negligently
contributed to the employee's injury. Although courts are in sharp disagree-
intervene in the insurer's third party action if the action is not "diligently prosecuted" or
if the court "deems it advisable in order to protect the interest of the employee."
38. See Behrendt, The Rationale of the Election of Remedies Under Worknen's Com-
pensation Acts, 12 U. Car. L. REv. 231 (1945); McCoid, supra note 6, at 425-36; LAasoN
§ 73.30; James, Social Insurance and Tort Liability: The Problem of Alternative Remedies,
27 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 537 (1952).
39. There is much diversity in the definition of the "third person." In some states the
third person may include everyone except the immediate employer. In many states, however,
the exclusiveness of the compensation benefits immunizes all employees and representatives
of the employer. Often, the general contractor is immune from liability to the employees of
his subcontractor. See McCoid, supra note 6, at 393-94.
40. See W. EA om AND M. PLANT, CASES ONT WoRKAN's COMENSATION 496-97
(1963).
41. See, e.g., Amo v. Empsall-Clark Co., 9 A.D.2d 852, 193 N.Y.S.2d 154 (3d Dep't
Mem. 1959).
42. Jones v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 145 W. Va. 478, 115 S.E.2d 129 (1960);
Trumbull Cliffs Furnace Co. v. Shachovsky, 111 Ohio St. 791, 146 N.E. 306 (1924). See
Behrendt, supra note 38, at 238-40 (1945). See criticism of the insurance analogy in
LARsolr, § 71.30; 2 F. HARPER AND F. JArxms, supra note 6, at § 25.22.
43. See 2 F. HAPRAND F. JA ES, supra note 6, at § 25.23.
44. Steffen, The Employer's "Indemnity" Action, 25 U. Cn. L. REV. 465 (1958).
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ment, most have held that even a negligent employer may be entitled to reim-
bursement from the third party.4
5
Third parties have had little success in securing contribution from negli-
gent employers. Contribution is normally denied on the theory that the employer
cannot be jointly liable in tort because of the operation of the exclusive remedy
clause in workmen's compensation statutes. 4 6 Third parties may recover over
against the employer, however, if the employer could be said to have breached
an independent duty owed to the third party.47
Third, it is often argued that the third party's liability should not be
affected simply because the injured employee is entitled to statutory benefits.
In other words, he is subject to a tort action despite the fact that the plaintiff
may also have recovered statutory benefits for the same injury.
In most states provisions for statutory subrogation seek to meet the objec-
tives raised above.48 The precise framework, however, varies widely from state
to state.49 The most common procedure permits the employee to recover full
damages from the third party, providing that the insurer shall have a lien on
the proceeds to the extent of his statutory liability. Many states provide for a
delayed right of action in the insurer should the employee not bring an action
during a prescribed period of time."
A number of states give the cause of action to the insurer in the first
instance, although some5' give a delayed right of action to the employee should
the insurer fail to sue. In some states the insurer and employer may have joint
rights to sue, the statutes typically providing for joinder.52
45. See LARsoN § 75.23. See Strauf v. Int'l Harvester Co., 14 A.D.2d 977, 221 N.Y.S.2d
494 (3d Dep't Mem. 1961), where the court rejected the third party's defense that the
employee, through his employer, was negligent. The court held that the allegations did not
constitute a defense if the third party was also negligent.
46. See LARsoN § 76.
47. See W. MALoNE AN M. PLANT, supra note 40, at 511-13; LARSON, §§ 76.30-76.53.
48. Ohio and West Virginia do not provide for the protection of insurers by permit-
ting subrogation. Since subrogation is considered a statutory creation rather than an equit-
able device, the employee may recover and retain full damages from the third party. See
Fischer Constr. Co. v. Stroud, 175 Ohio St. 31, 191 NE.2d 164 (1963); Mercer v. Ott, 78
W. Va. 629, 89 S.E. 952 (1916).
49. See generally LARsoN, § 74.
50. A relatively clear statement of this approach is found in the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Worker's Act, 33 U.S.C. § 933 (Supp. 1967):
§ 933. Compensation for injuries where third persons are liable.
(a) If on account of a disability or death for which compensation is payable
under this chapter the person entitled to such compensation determines that some
person other than the employer or a person or persons in his employ is liable in
damages, he need not elect whether to receive such compensation or to recover
damages against such third person.
(b) Acceptance of such compensation under an award in a compensation order
filed by the deputy commissioner shall operate as an assignment to the employer
of all right of the person entitled to compensation to recover damages against
such third person unless such person shall commence an action against such third
person within six months after such award.
See Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Wynn, 343 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
51. In Michigan, for instance, the employee's cause of action is assigned unconditionally
to the payor of compensation. Micx. Com. LAws § 413.15 (1967).
52. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 109.29 (1957); CAL. LABoR CoD. AN. § 3852 (West 1955).
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Commonly, one of the parties is given the right to sue, with the condition
that failure to bring an action transfers the cause of action to the other. In
New York, for instance, the employee must sue within six months after the
awarding of compensation, or at most within one year from the date the action
accrues. Failure to sue operates as an assignment of the action to the insurer.Y
In Illinois the right to sue is transferred to the employer three months before
the expiration of the statute of limitations.54 A similar provision exists in Mich-
igan, except that the employee may sue even after the one-year period has
expired if the insurer has not yet begun an action.55
In New York various protections are provided so that the employee is
warned that his cause of action might be statutorily assigned to the insurer.
The failure to commence an action within the appropriate time is not an
assignment unless the carrier has notified the claimant by personal service or
registered mail, at least 30 days prior to the expiration of the time limited for
the commencement of such action, that the failure to commence action oper-
ates as an assignment of the cause of action. If the carrier fails to send a
notice, the time for the commencement of an action is extended until 30 days
after the carrier does notify the claimant in writing.",
Although the assignment occurs after an employee has "taken compensa-
tion under this chapter," payment of compensation without an award affects
the assignment.57 In American Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v. Niagara Mohawk
Power Corp.,58 claimant had not yet received death benefits, but notified the
carrier that she intended to proceed under the compensation act rather than
against a third party. The court held that this amounted to an assignment of
In Wisconsin the insurer can recover the full amount of the employee's damages, for the
benefit of the employee and himself, but only if the employee has received notice of the
suit and an opportunity to join in the action. California, on the other hand, will permit the
insurer to recover total damages only if the employee actually joins in the action.
53. N.Y. WORKMN'S Comp. LAW § 29(1)(a) (McKinney 1965).
54. ILL. ANx. STAT. ch. 48 § 138.5 (b) (Smith-Hurd 1969). See also FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 440.39 (1966); NJ. STAT. ANN. 34.15-40 (1959); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-504 (1964).
55. Harrison v. Ford Motor Co. 370 Mich. 683, 122 N.E.2d 680 (1963). See OaRE. REv.
STAT. § 656.566 (1967). The paying agency may require the workman to exercise his right
to sue the third party. Unless such election is made within 60 days from the receipt or
service of such demand, the employee will be deemed to have assigned his cause of action
to the paying agency. If the employee elects to pursue his common law action, he has 90
days to institute such action.
56. N.Y. WoRxr''s Comp. LAW § 29(2) (McKinney 1965); see Bedsole v. Con-
solidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., 203 Misc. 194, 118 N.Y.S.2d 192 (Sup. Ct. 1952). In
one case the employer was not insured, did not pay any compensation, and was insolvent.
The claimant commenced his third party suit after the sLx month limitation period had run.
This could have meant that his rights were assigned to the employer if the statute had been
construed literally, since the operative fact is the award of compensation rather than its
payment. The court felt that the legislature could not have intended such a harsh and
illogical result. It held that automatic assignment does not take place where there has been
no payment of compensation. The suit was held timely, since it was within the overall
three year statute of personal injury actions. See Juba v. General Builders Supply Corp., 7
N.Y.2d 48, 163 N.E.2d 328, 194 N.Y.S.2d 503 (1959).
57. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. of Illinois v. Beschner, 198 Misc. 375, 97 N.Y.S.2d 781(Sup. Ct. 1950).
58. 51 Misc. 2d 940, 274 N.Y.S.2d 198 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
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the cause of action, even though the statute referred to a situation where a
dependent had "taken compensation."
In Massachusetts, unlike New York, the subrogee receives the first oppor-
tunity to sue. If the employee has claimed or received compensation within
six months of the injury, and if the insurer fails to institute the third party
proceeding within nine months after the injury, the employee may begin the
action."
A similar result is achieved in states which provide for an election of
remedies. In Colorado, for instance, the "awarding of compensation" operates
as an assignment of the cause of action to the insurer.60 The insurer may sue,
but, oddly, may only recover the amount of its statutory liability. Thus, the
third party's liability is reduced if the employee elects to take compensation
rather than sue. In Minnesota, an election to take compensation also serves
to assign the cause of action to the insurer. The insurer, however, can recover
the employee's total damages, the excess going to the employee. 61
Although the mechanics differ widely, the ultimate result of following
the statutory procedure is approximately the same when the tort recovery
exceeds statutory benefits: the insurer receives the amount of benefits it has
paid with most or all of the excess going to the employee. If the tort recovery
does not exceed the statutory benefits, most states permit the employee to re-
cover a deficiency judgment. Strict election states, of course, would not permit
deficiency judgments.
Questions have arisen regarding the elements of the employer's lien and
the part of the recovery to which it applies. In regard to the size of the lien,
the compensation expenditure for which the insurer is entitled to reimburse-
ment includes not only wage benefits but hospital and medical payments as
well as funeral expenses.62 The lien normally includes only sums the employer
has been obliged to pay prior to the third party recovery. Normally, the ex-
cess received by the employee becomes a credit against future liability. That
is, the insurer is relieved of his obligation to pay further compensation up to
the amount of the balance, or excess, of the recovery.6 3 A variation of this
procedure is to determine the present value of estimated future compensation
benefits and permit the insurer to retain this sum in trust. As compensation
thereafter becomes due, payment is made from this trust fund. Any remainder
which may exist after compensation liability ceases is then paid to the injured
employee or his representatives. 4
59. MASS. GENr. LAWS ANN. ch. 152 § 15 (1958). In Maine the employee is entitled
to proceed if the insurer has not brought an action within 30 days after demand by the
employee. ME. REv. STAT. AxN. tit. 39 § 68 (1965). See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.2(1965).
60. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 81-13-8 (1963).
61. MwN. STAT. ANN. § 176.061 (1966).
62. See LARSON § 74.34.
63. See, e.g., CAL. LABOR CODE ANx. § 3858 (West 1955); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.39(3)
(1966).
64. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 933(e)(2) (Supp. 1967).
525
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Usually, attorney's fees and expenses are deducted from the gross re-
covery prior to the employer's lien and the employee's excess recovery. 8 If
the sum recovered by the employee is more than enough to pay attorney's fees
and reimburse the carrier, the carrier is reimbursed in full, and is not required
to share the legal expenses involved in obtaining the recovery. In other words,
the legal expenses diminish the overall sum to which the insurer's claim at-
taches.
Granting the insurer a right to recover based on its compensation obliga-
tion suggests that the lien should not attach to those items of recovery which
are not recoverable under workmen's compensation acts, such as pain and
suffering. The question does not often arise since the amount recovered against
the third party for loss of earnings and medical expenses usually exceeds the
amount of the insurer's obligation for these items. As stated above, benefits
are usually based on a percentage of loss and often are limited by statutory
maximums. Moreover, jury verdicts rarely segregate damages for items such
as pain and suffering. In any event, it is common to provide that the employer's
claim of priority attaches to the entire judgment.60 One alternative might be
to require juries to itemize damages in these situations.
Thus far, the discussion has assumed the normal pattern by which the
subrogee receives his total lien before the employee is entitled to any excess. A
number of states have begun to vary this formula. In Massachusetts, for ex-
ample, the insurer-plaintiff may retain one-fifth of the excess, presumably to
encourage the insurer to seek more than the amount necessary to satisfy
his compensation obligation. 7 In New York, the employee is granted the first
opportunity to sue, and he may retain the entire excess. Should the cause of
action pass to the insurer, however, the insurer may retain one-third of the
excess.68 Again, as in Massachusetts, this is probably designed to encourage
the insurer to press for more than the amount of his lien, rather than making
it tempting to settle for no more than out-of-pocket costs.0 9 It is important to
note, that the statutory scheme in New York encourages the employee to press
his negligence claim, since, should the insurer receive the right to sue, the em-
ployee would lose one-third of the excess above the amount of the lien. True,
the employee would be encouraged to bring suit simply because he can best rep-
resent and protect his interests; the insurer is primarily motivated to recoup
65. See LAxsox § 74.32.
66. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm., 8 Cal. App. 2d 499, 47 P.2d
783 (1935). Cf., Barch v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 212 Ark. 942, 208 S.W.2d 495 (1948),
where the employee, after receiving compensation, sued the third party for pain and suffer-
ing only; held, employer's lien attached to judgment. Employee could not avoid lien by
attempting to separate his third party suit into separate claims.
67. MAss. GnN. LAWS Axx. ch. 152 § 15 (1958). See also 33 U.S.C. § 930(e) (2). The
insurer has the first opportunity to sue.
68. N.Y. WoRxaraN's Comrp. LAW § 29 (McKinney 1965).
69. In death cases, this % is distributed, not as unbequeathed assets under the De-
cedent Estate Law, but, rather, as compensation according to the ratios for dependents in
the compensation law. See Skakandy v. Wreckers and Excavators, Inc., 298 N.Y. 888, 84
N.E2.d 805 (1949).
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its workmen's compensation liability. The loss of a substantial portion of the
excess to the insurer, however, adds a powerful incentive to the employee's in-
terest in prosecuting his claim. This incentive-is relevant to the question of
apportioning the employee-plaintiff's attorney's fees. We shall return to this
matter at a later point.
More radical variations are made in many states, and details are provided
in the next section. In brief, however, some states guarantee the employee a
percentage of the recovery less expenses, unaffected by the insurer's lien.
7 0
There are three possible reasons for such a guarantee. First, many perceive an
inequity in those cases in which nothing is left for the employee-plaintiff after
the lien is subtracted. The cause of this alleged inequity, however, is unclear.
The employee has at least received his statutory compensation. The insurer has
been reimbursed out of the third party recovery, and the employee receives
nothing for his efforts in bringing his tort action. We might sympathize with
the employee, but nothing assures him a recovery in excess of statutory
benefits. Alternatively, the guarantee could be thought of as a rough apportion-
ment of attorney's fees. Normally, attorney's fees are a prior lien on the third
party recovery and the lien applies to the remainder. In effect, then, the employee
pays the attorney's fees, even though he may receive no damages, 7' and the
insurer recovers his lien without payment of attorney's fees. It is also possible
that the one-third guarantee is thought to compensate the employee for items
such as pain and suffering, which are not compensable under workmen's com-
pensation statutes. Such an apportionment is arbitrary, of course, and recoveries
even for items compensable under compensation statutes normally exceed com-
pensation benefits.
If the purpose of the guarantee is to compensate the employee for at least
a portion of his attorney's fees, less crude devices are available. Attorney's fees
may exceed one-third of the recovery, and statutes could specifically provide
for apportionment of fees. Indeed, as hereinafter detailed, a growing number of
states do apportion attorney's fees, either based upon an equitable division by
the trial court judge or upon a statutory formula.72 This development has
surprisingly been overlooked in texts and law reviews. Indeed, a few states,
such as Missouri and Florida, have made even more radical breaks with tradition.
In these states the trial court is permitted to reduce the employer's lien as well
as the employee's attorney's fees.
APPORTIONMENT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND REDUCTION OF LIENS:
STATUTORY EXPERIMENTATION
A detailed look at experiments-in various states follows. No attempt was
made to canvass the statutes of all states, but an investigation was made in all
70. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.29 (1957); ARx. STAT. AN. § 81-1340 (1960).
71. See Strachan Shipping Corp. v. Melvin, 327 F.2d 83, 86 (5th Cir. 1963) (Brown,
J., dissenting).
72. See, e.g., Mna. STAT. AxN. § 176.061(6) (1966).,
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heavily-industrialized states as well as those states which have shown a pen-
chant for innovation and experimentation. The statutory description involves
simple mathematical calculations, but such irritations are necessary for an un-
derstanding of the operational significance of the various statutory schemes.
Apportioning Attorney's Fees and Reducing the Insurer's Lien
Missouri and Florida provide for apportionment of attorney's fees as well
as equitable division of the insurer's lien. In Missouri 78 if the employee sues,
the employer pays "from his share of the recovery a proportionate share of the
expense of the recovery, including a reasonable attorney's fee." After that, the
balance is apportioned "in the same ratio that the amount due the employer
bears to the total amount recovered, or the balance of the recovery may be
divided between the employer and the employee or his dependents as they may
agree."7 4
Thus, if an employee recovers $30,000, and the lien is for $15,000, the
court would first subtract attorney's fees and other expenses from the total re-
covery. Assuming fees and expenses of $10,000, the net recovery would be
$20,000. The remainder exceeds the lien, but the court will apportion the net
recovery 50-50, since the lien is one-half the total recovery. Thus, each will
receive $10,000. One court has achieved the same result by reducing the lien,
$15,000, by the ratio of the net recovery to the total recovery: since $20,000 is
2/3 of $30,000, the employer will recover only 2/3 of his lien, or $10,000. The
result is thus the same under either approach.75
Based upon limited case authority (most apportionments will not be re-
ported) the Missouri courts seem to be apportioning only attorney's fees, rather
than dividing fees and reducing liens. In states that apportion fees, such as
Maryland,7 6 for instance, the insurer pays that part of the fees which his lien
bears to the recovery. Thus, the result will be exactly like the result in the
Missouri example above which is based on an actual case. Whether Missouri
courts actually reduce the lien as well as the employee's attorneys fees is unclear.
The actual operation of Florida's provision is also cloudy, but apportion-
ment is left to the discretion of the trial judge rather than being set by a
statutory formula.
Sub-section 3(a) of the Florida statutev7 states that if the employee files
suit the carrier shall file a notice of lien which shall be recorded and shall be
a lien upon any judgment recovered to the extent that the court may determine
to be their pro rata share for compensation benefits paid or to be paid under
the provisions of this law, based upon such equitable distribution of the amount
73. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.150(3) (1965).
74. This apportionment only applies when the employee sues. See Mo. ANN. STAT.
287.150(1) (1965) which provides that the employer may get the entire lien if he sues.
Maryland Cas. Co. v. Gen. Elec., 418 S.W.2d 115 (Mo. 1967).
75. See Knox v. Land Constr. Co., 345 S.W.2d 244 (Mo. 1961).
76. Mo. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 58 (1964).
77. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.39 (1966).
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recovered as the court may determine, less their pro rata share of all court costs
expended by the plaintiff in the prosecution of the suit including reasonable
attorney's fees for plaintiff's attorney, such pro ration of court costs and at-
torney's fees to be made by the judge of the trial court upon application therefor
and notice to the adverse party.
Sub-section 4(a)78 states that the injured employee or his dependents have
one year after the cause of action accrues to bring an action. If they fail to,
the insurance carrier may institute an action against a third party. The insurer
may recover all amounts paid as compensation and medical benefits under the
provisions of this law and also the present value of all future compensation
benefits payable (to be reduced to its present value and to be retained as a
trust fund from which future payments of compensation are to be made),
together with all court costs, including attorney's fees expended in the prosecu-
tion of such suit, to be pro rated as provided by sub-section (3) of this section.
The remainder is to be paid to the employee.
Under the Florida statute, when the employee sues, the carrier is entitled
to receive on its subrogation claim only its "pro rata share" based upon an
equitable distribution. The scope and discretion of the individual judge
is quite broad. Thus the failure to award anything to the insurance carrier in
determining equitable distribution was not an abuse of discretion in view of
amount of the judgment and the cost of expenses and attorney's fees incurred
by the employee.80 The discretionary power of the trial judge in making
equitable distribution is not affected by the fact that damages were determined
by a jury. 1
In one case a widow settled her wrongful death action for $40,000, but the
trial judge determined that her "full compensable loss" was $79,000. He first
deducted from the settlement $5,000 for loss of consortium together with at-
torney's fees and costs. The court then determined that from the balance the
carrier was entitled to that percentage of his lien which the balance bore to
the total compensable loss.82 In other words, the court began with the settle-
ment figure, $40,000, and from that figure subtracted attorney's fees. The re-
mainder represented 27 percent of plaintiff's "compensable loss." The carrier's
reimbursement was thus limited to 27 percent of its lien. Since the plaintiff
only recovered 27 percent of her compensable loss, the carrier only received
27 percent of its claim. 88
78. Id.
79. See Security Mut. Cas. Co. v. Orice, 172 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 1965). The words "pro
rata" must be "construed in their broadest aspect and mathematical calculations cannot be
applied to determine pro rata share.' See also Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v.
Bennett, 131 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1961); Arex Indem. Co. v. Radin, 72 So. 2d 393 (Fla. 1954).
80. See U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Harb, 170 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 1965). See also Luby
Chev. Inc. v. Foster, 177 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 1965).
81. See U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Harb, 170 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 1965).
82. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. McNair, 152 So. 2d 805 (Fla. 1963).
83. When the employer sues, attorney's fees are pro rated, but the employer may keep
the full amount of its lien. See General Guar. Ins. Co. v. Moore, 143 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 1962).
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In summary, then, the few reported Missouri cases show a reluctance to go
beyond the apportionment of attorney's fees despite broad statutory provisions.
Florida courts have been less restrained, and, as the above example demonstrates,
courts have apportioned the entire third party recovery.
Guaranteeing the Employee a Percentage of the Recovery
Four states guarantee the employee a flat percentage of the recovery after
deduction of attorney's fees: Wisconsin, Arkansas, Oregon, and Minnesota.
In Wisconsin,8 4 the employee may proceed under the statute and may
also bring an action against the third party. Unlike the laws of other states, the
act does not initially give the cause of action to one party. Either party may
sue giving notice to the other, or they both may decide to sue at the same time.
Each party has an equal voice in the prosecution of such claim, and disputes
are passed upon by the court before whom the case is pending, and if no action
is pending, then by a court of record or the industrial commission. After de-
ducting the reasonable costs of collection, which include attorney's fees,80
one-third of the remainder of the recovery is paid to the injured employee. Out
of the balance, the insurance carrier is reimbursed for all payments made by
it or which it may be obligated to pay in the future. Any excess is paid to the
employee.
If both the employee and the employer join in pressing the claim and are
represented by counsel, the attorney's fees allowed as a part of the cost of
collection are, unless otherwise agreed upon, divided between such attorneys as
directed by the court or by the industrial commission.
Arkansas provides for a similar distribution."6 As in Wisconsin, reasonable
costs of collection are deducted from the third party recovery first. One-third
of the remainder belongs to the employee or his dependents in every case. The
remainder is applied against the lien, and any excess belongs to the employee.
As in Wisconsin, the employee is guaranteed one-third of the recovery, excluding
expenses and attorney's fees, no matter who sues. Minnesota follows the same
formula.87
In Oregon, under the newest American workmen's compensation statute,
the employee is guaranteed one-quarter of the third party recovery excluding
expenses and attorney's fees.8 8 If the employee sues he must notify the carrier.
The paying agency has a lien on the recovery but the total proceeds are dis-
tributed as follows: The cost and attorney's fees incurred by the employee are
first subtracted, and then the employee receives at least 25 percent of the
balance of such recovery. The paying agency is paid and retains that part of
84. WIs. STAT. ANx. § 102.29 (1957).
85. In referring to the case in which the employee and the insurer both sue, the act
refers to "the attorney's fees allowed as a part of the costs of collection .... " The cost of
collection, therefore, includes attorney's fees.
86. Ax . STAT. Awx. § 81-1340 (1960).
87. IwN . STAT. AwN. § 176.061(6) (1967).
88. ORE. REV. STAT. § 656.593 (1967).
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the balance which compensates it for its expenditures. The balance of the re-
covery is then paid to the employee.
Unlike the other two states, however, the one-quarter is not guaranteed
when the employer sues. Under section 656.591 the employer may recover the
expenses incurred in making the recovery and also the amount expended for
compensation and medical benefits. Thus, the employee is encouraged to sue, for
otherwise he will not be guaranteed one-quarter of the recovery.
8 9
As stated earlier, the function of these provisions is not clear. Why should
the insurer's lien be reduced by an arbitrary amount? Perhaps to encourage em-
ployees to sue. Yet, in two states, a guarantee exists even though the insurer
brings the action. Perhaps, then, the guarantee is a disguised sharing of attor-
ney's fees. Oregon's provision is consistent with this thought, since the guarantee
exists only when the employee sues. Yet, in Wisconsin and Arkansas, the em-
ployee is guaranteed one-third even when he does not incur attorney's fees.
Another possibility is that it is simply thought equitable to guarantee the
employee a portion of the damages a jury awards to him. Whoever brings the
action, the measure of damages is still the same. Since a portion of those damages
are based upon non-compensable items under compensation law, the guarantee
perhaps makes a rough division. Alternatively, the guarantee may be intended
to require the employer to share in the cost of securing the tort recovery. 0
Not only is the justification for a percentage guaranty unclear, but its role
is also cloudy. There is no problem when the recovery is sufficiently large to
cover attorney's fees, insurer's lien, and at least the employee's statutory share.
The problem cases, of course, arise when the recovery is insufficient to protect
all these interests. No figures exist to determine the frequency or magnitude of
the problem, although the number of states with apportionment schemes could
indicate that the problem is not insignificant.
When the tort recovery is insufficient, the guarantee operates to reduce the
lien by the employee's prior right to take one-fourth or one-third of the net
recovery. It is possible that attorney's fees could consume the entire recovery
leaving nothing for the employee and insurer. Thus, the employee's guarantee
is operative only when the recovery exceeds attorney's fees but is insufficient to
pay the three statutory liens. In this case, the guarantee makes certain that
the employee receives at least some of the recovery. In cases in which there is
an excess, the statutory guarantee may enlarge the employee's recovery. Assume
a recovery of $30,000, attorney's fees of $10,000, and a lien of $15,000. In New
York, the employee would receive $5,000, the excess remaining after deduction
of fees and insurer's lien. Using the same figures, an employee in Wisconsin
would receive one-third of the net recovery (1/3 X (30,000-10,000)), or
89. Cf. MODEL WORK. CoM. AcT. § 43 (U.S. Dep't of Labor) which guarantees the
employee one-third of the net proceeds, but only when the employee sues. The employer as
plaintiff may recover his total lien plus one-fifth of the proceeds. The act combines, then,
elements of the Wisconsin and New York approach.
90. Memorandum submitted to Minnesota legislature, House file #397.
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$6666.66. Since there was some excess, however, it is hard to explain the role
of the guarantee.
Apportioning Attorney's Fees
A growing number of states make provision for the apportioning of attor-
ney's fees when the employee's attorney secures a recovery for the insurer.91
Although not all states were investigated, the nine states discussed below with
the inclusion of New York and Ohio, include all the highly industrial states.
Ohio, as mentioned before, has no subrogation mechanism, and New York does
not provide for apportionment of attorney's fees.92
There exists considerable variation in approach and method of apportion-
ment among the nine states which do provide for apportionment of fees. In three
of the states investigated, California, Michigan and Kansas, apportionment is
left to the trial court, without a specific statutory formula. The Michigan statute,
for instance, provides that attorney's fees "shall be apportioned by the court
between the parties as their interests appear at the time of said recovery.""9
The employee has one year to sue before the cause of action is automatically
assigned to the employer. Like other states, costs are initially deducted, then
the lien, and the employee receives the excess which becomes a credit against
future compensation liability. The difference here is that attorney's fees are
apportioned, although the exact formula to be used is not spelled out.94
Although no formula is expressly set forth in the statutes mentioned above,
the results will probably not differ markedly from a second group of states which,
as in Minnesota, expressly require the employer to bear
that proportion of the reasonable attorney's fees and costs, incurred in
making collection from and enforcing liability against the party other
than the employer which the amount claimed by the employer for
91. MD. AwN. CODE art. 101, § 58 (1964); MSCH. Coiw. LAWS § 413.15 (1967); KA,.
GEx. STAT. AN. § 44-504 (Supp. 1967); N.J. STAT. Amr. § 34:15-40 (1959); Ir..
ANNx. STAT. ch. 48 § 138.5 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967); PA. STAT. A=¢. tit. 77 § 671 (1952);
IND. Aim. STAT. § 40-1213 (1965); CAL. LABOR CODE Aim. § 3856 (West 1955); Mm.
STAT. AxN. § 176.061(6) (1966).
92. Utah has overruled precedent and held that the plaintiff in his third party action
was entitled to deduct reasonable attorney's fees from the carrier's share of the recovery.
See Worthen v. Shurtleff & Andrews, Inc., 46 P.2d 233 (Utah 1967).
93. McH. Comr. LAWS § 413.15 (1967) ; see Horsey v. Stone & Webster Engr. Corp.,
162 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Mch. 1958).
94. The California act was amended in 1949 to provide for the fixing of reasonable
attorney's fees and litigation expenses by the court in any case. CAL. LABOR CODE ANN;.
§ 3856(d) (West 1955). See Bosch v. Standard Oil Co., 193 Cal. App. 2d 426, 14 Cal. Rptr.
427 (1961). See also Spriggs, Inc. v. Industrial Accident Comm., 42 Cal. 2d 785, 269 P.2d
876 (1954); Record v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 103 Cal. App. 2d 434, 229 P.2d 851 (1951).
Similarly, the employee has one year from the date of the injury to bring action under the
Kansas provision. KAw. GEN. STAT. Aiwr. § 44-504 (Supp. 1967). "The Court shall fix
attorney's fees which shall be paid proportionately by the employer and the employee in
amounts determined by the court." U.S. Fiduciary & Guar. Co. v. Allied Mut. Cas. Co., 190
Kan. 383, 375 P.2d 619 (1962). The provision for fixing attorney's fees is located in a
paragraph dealing with a situation in which the cause of action is assigned to the employer.
This gives the impression that attorney's fees are apportioned only when the employer sues.
It would seem, however, that this type of section as in other states would only apply when
the claimant sues, or, perhaps, when either party sues.
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deduction from, or to be retained against, compensation payable bears
to the whole amount recovered from such other party.95
The approach taken by Pennsylvania 96 and Maryland 97 is similar. The em-
ployer in Pennsylvania is subrogated to the rights of the employee against the
third party to the extent of the compensation payable under the act; "reasonable
attorney's fees and other proper disbursements incurred in obtaining a recovery
or in effecting a compromise settlement shall be prorated between the employer
and employee. . . . The employer shall pay that proportion of the attorney's
fees and other proper disbursements that the amount of compensation paid or
payable at the time of recovery or settlement bears to the total recovery or
settlement." Any recovery in excess of the compensation paid by the employer
goes to the employee and is treated as an advance payment by the employer on
account of any future installments of compensation.9" Thus, the amount of the
pro rata share includes benefits paid, accrued, and to be paid in the future, i.e.,
the total amount of the compensation award, and not merely the amount to be
reimbursed. 99
Note that the employer's share is not based simply on amounts paid to the
time of recovery, but also includes the future value of estimated future com-
pensation liability. The result is to make the employer's share larger, thus
making him liable for a larger share of the attorney's fees. After bearing his
share of the fees, however, he actually recovers only the amount actually paid
to the employee. The excess is paid to the employee, but it is treated as a
credit against future compensation installments. The employee, then, receives
the present value of his future benefits at no actual loss to the insurer (except
for the loss of interest which might have been earned in the future). Since the
excess received by the employee actually reduces the employer's liability, it
seems equitable for the employer to bear part of the cost of securing this benefit.
Maryland's 0 0 approach is similar, although the act is less clear. The insurer
has the first opportunity to sue the third party. If the employer or insurer does
not within two months after the granting of the award start a proceeding against
the third party, the injured employee may sue. Like the law in other states, at-
torney's fees are subtracted first, and then the insurer subtracts his lein from
95. MwN. STAT. ANN. § 176.061(6) (1966).
96. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 671 (1952).
97. Mo. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 58 (1964).
98. See Downey v. Moyer, Inc., 184 F. Supp. 31 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd, 278 F.2d 753.
See also Mazzeo v. M. & J. McHugh, 199 Pa. Super. 400, 185 A.2d 638 (1962); Soliday v.
Hires Turner Glass Co., 187 Pa. Super. 44, 142 A.2d 525 (1958).
99. See Wall v. Conn. Welding & Mach. Co., 197 Pa. Super. 360, 179 A.2d 235 (1962).
See also Note, Workmen's Compensation Subrogation Suits: Allocation of Counsel Fees,
28 U. PiTT. L. REv. 503 (1967). Thus, if the entire liability is $15,000 and there is a third
person recovery of $30,000 and a contingent fee of 3A or $10,000: the ratio of compensation
to the total recovery of $30,000 is 1:2 ($15,000:$30,000). The attorney's fees are divided in
half, and $5,000 is then subtracted from the lien of $15,000, leaving the employer with
$10,000. Another way to compute this is to divide the recovery in half giving the employer
and claimant each $15,000. Half of the attorney's fees are subtracted from each amount
leaving claimant and employer each with $10,000.
100. M .ANN. CODE art. 101, § 58 (1964).
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the total recovery. However, court costs and attorney fees are paid by the em-
ployee and the employer "in the proportion that the amount received by each
shall bear to the whole amount paid in settlement of any claim or satisfaction
of any judgment obtained in the case. '10 1 Since the employer may sue the
third party first, an incentive to do so is created since the employer may then
retain the entire amount of his lien.
In three states, Indiana, New Jersey, and Illinois, specific percentages of
attorney's fees are allocable to the employer. In Indiana,10 2 for instance, the
employer must pay a prorated share of all costs and necessary expenses incurred
in the third party action as well as a percentage of the attorney's fees incurred.
Specifically, the employer pays one-quarter if a settlement is reached, or one-
third if the recovery is secured after a trial. Although legal fees would be
greater in the latter situation, the reason for the varying percentage is unclear.
Moreover, it is unclear if the employer pays a percentage of the reasonable at-
torney's fees, or a percentage of his reimbursement. The statutory language
indicates the latter, although the act obliges the insurer to pay this amount to
the employee's attorney. Perhaps it is assumed that the attorney's fees will
always exceed a percentage of the insurer's reimbursement. The result then is
similar to that reached in those states which guarantee the employee a percent-
age of the net recovery. Here, though, the percentage is based on the amount
payable to the employer, rather than the normally larger net recovery.
The aforementioned interpretation of Indiana's scheme is strengthened by
similar interpretations of statutes in New Jersey and Illinois. In New Jersey,
for instance, the plaintiff-employee's attorney receives one-third of the employer's
recovery.103 Thus, in a case in which the tort action resulted in a $60,000 verdict
and attorney's fees were $10,000, or 1/6 of the recovery, and the employer was
held entitled to reimbursement in the amount of $17,304.50 for its compensation
liability, the employer could be assessed up to 1/3 of the $17,304.50 for at-
torney's fees.104 The section is read as making the employer liable for the em-
ployer's proportionate share of the employee's attorney's fees, but not in excess
of 1/3 of the proportion of the recovery which inures to the employer. This
relates to the total compensation liability of the employer, even though much
of the obligation remains unfilled at the time of the third party recovery.10 5
Apparently, the court can assess up to one-third of the lien to the employer, thus
reducing the employee's liability to his attorney.10
101. See McNally v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 247 F. Supp. 444 (D.D.C. 1965).
102. IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-1213 (1965).
103. N.J. STAT. Axx. § 34:15-40 (1959). See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Lumber Mut. Cas.
Ins. Co. of N.Y., 20 N.J. Super. 265, 89 A.2d 717 (1952).
104. The assessment was not required to be limited to :6 merely because the employee
paid his attorney only :6 of the amount of the recovery. Dante v. William T. Gotelli, Inc.,
17 N.J. 254, 111 A.2d 267 (1955); Caputo v. Best Foods, 17 N.J. 259, 111 A.2d 261 (1955).
105. See Dante v. William T. Gotelli, Inc., 17 N.J. 254, 111 A.2d 267 (1955); Caputo
v. Best Foods, 17 N.J. 259, 111 A.2d 261 (1955).
106. The attorney is not entitled to collect an additional fee from the employer. See
Dante v. William T. Gotelli, Inc., 17 N.J. 254, 111 A.2d 267 (1955).
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A similar result is reached under Illinois' statute.' °7 Out of any reimburse-
ment received by the employer, he must pay his pro rata share of all costs and
reasonably necessary expenses in connection with such third party claim. Where
the services of an attorney of the employee has resulted in or substantially
contributed to the procurement of the settlement or proceeds, in the absence
of other agreements, the employer must pay such attorney 25 percent of the
gross amount of such reimbursement. Unlike New Jersey where a maximum of
one-third is fixed the actual apportionment to be made by the court, the Illinois
act flatly states that the employer shall pay one-fourth of the amount of its re-
imbursement to the employee's attorney. Again, although it is not clear, it is
suspected this is not an amount in addition to his attorney's fees, but a -way
of reducing the employee's liability to his attorney. This arbitrary figure may
be designed to induce private agreements. Again, if the employer sues, he
deducts all his attorney's fees, keeps his lien and pays the excess to the em-
ployee.108
In summary, then, most of these states apportion attorney's fees on a pro-
rated basis, normally using the ratio of lien to the recovery minus expenses.
A number require the employer to pay a flat percentage out of the lien he
receives to the client's attorney. The prorated share would seem to be fair and
a more equitable device than a flat sum. A combination of these devices is ap-
parently used in New Jersey, which requires the employer to pay a proportionate
share out of his reimbursements up to a certain percentage of his reimbursement.
Impliedly, the court will apportion, but an upper limit is placed on the em-
ployer's share.
No APPORTIONING OF ATTORNEY'S FEES: NEW YORK
The leading state having no provision for apportionment of attorney's fees
is New York.'09 Since New York is the focus of this study, New York practice
will be set out in some detail.
The injured employee and his dependents need not elect whether to take
compensation and medical benefits under the act or pursue the remedy against
a third person, but may take compensation and medical benefits and at the same
time sue the negligent third party." 0 The right in section 29 is limited to any
107. ILL. AxN. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.5 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967).
108. If the employee does not bring a proceeding against such third party at any time
prior to three months before such action would be barred at law, the employer may then
sue in his name or the name of the employee. See Reno v. Md. Cas. Co., 27 Il1. 2d 245, 188
N.E.2d 657 (1963).
109. In Massachusetts, there is also no provision for apportionment of attorney's fees,
although the act states that the employee and the insurer may agree to share the attorney'sfees, with the provision that any agreement will be invalid if the employee is required to
bear a greater apportionment of such expenses than the proportion of that part of the
excess received by him bears to the total sum recovered by him and the insurer, exclusive
of interest and cost. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 152, § 15 (1958).
110. Since 1937 the employee has no longer been obligated to make a binding election,
and has been entitled under the act to collect compensation and still maintain an action at
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third party who is not "in the same employ." The employee may sue any time
prior to taking compensation and medical benefits or within six months after
the awarding of compensation or nine months after the enactment of a law or
laws creating, establishing, or affording a new or additional remedy or remedies.
In any event, the third party action must be begun before the expiration of
one year from the date such action accrues. If the employee pursues his action
against the third party, the state insurance fund or other carrier has a lien on
the proceeds of any recovery, whether by judgment or settlement, after the
deduction of reasonable necessary expenditures including attorney's fees, incurred
in effecting such recovery, to the extent of the total amount of compensation
awarded or estimated and the expenses for medical treatment."' Such recovery
shall be deemed for the benefit of such funds or carrier. Finally, if such action
is begun, notice shall be given within 30 days thereafter to the chairman, the
employer, and the insurance carrier upon a form described by the chairman.
Under subsection 2 of section 29 if the employee or his dependents have
taken compensation under the chapter, but have failed to commence an action
within the time limited by subdivision 1, "such failure shall operate as an as-
signment of such action against such other to the state for the benefit of the
state's insurance fund. . ." or other carrier. If the insurer then pursues the action,
it is permitted to take from a recovery the total amount of compensation awarded
to the employee along with medical expenses, together with reasonable and
necessary expenses incurred in effecting the recovery."12 Thus, the carrier is
assured full reimbursement before the employee can have the advantage of any
excess beyond the statutory limits." 3 A similar approach is followed under section
227 of the Workman's Compensation Law dealing with temporary disability
which does not arise out of and in the course of employment." 4
Thus, the employer receives the full amount of its lien without proportion-
ately sharing the cost of attorney's fees. Subsection 1 of section 29 states
that the carrier shall have a lien on the "proceeds of any recovery... after the
law, the recovery being subject to the carrier's lien for the amounts of compensation paid.
N.Y. WORxMN'S Coiar. LAW § 29 (McKinney 1965).
111. A notice of lien need not be served in order to become effective. This is a
statutory lien which attaches without the necessity of a notice. Calhoun v. West End
Brewing Co., 269 App. Div. 398, 56 N.Y.S.2d 105 (4th Dep't 1945) ; Comm'rs of State Ins.
Fund v. Allstate Ins. Co., 41 Misc. 2d 189, 245 N.Y.S.2d 575 (Civ. Ct. of the City of N.Y.
1963), aff'd, 42 Misc. 2d 141, 247 N.Y.S.2d 414 (Sup. Ct. 1963); Comm'rs of State Ins.
Fund. v. Sims, 187 Misc. 815, 67 N.Y.S.2d 665 (Sup. Ct. 1946); Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Employers Mut. Life Ins. Co., 57 Misc. 2d 764, 293 N.Y.S.2d 735 (Utica City Ct. 1968).
112. See Ocean Steamship Co. v. Lumberman's Mut. Cas. of Ill., 125 F.2d 925 (2d Cir.
1942).
113. One court has said that the primary purpose of the sections dealing with subroga-
tion is to prevent the double recovery to the detriment of one who has already made
payment. Amo v. Empsall-Clark Co., 9 A.D.2d 852, 853, 193 N.Y.S.2d 154, 157 (3d Dep't
1959).
114. See, e.g., Great American Ins. Co. v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 30 A.D.2d
743, 291 N.Y.S.2d 291 (3d Dep't Mem. 1968). The court held that outstanding doctors' bills
could not be considered "necessary expenditures . . . incurred in effecting such recovery."
Only those expenses which are "legal in nature" or "attributable to legal procedures are
deductible."
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deduction of reasonable and necessary expenditures, including attorney's fees,
included in effecting such recovery, to the extent of the total amount of com-
pensation awarded... and the expenses for medical treatment .... " Thus, the
employer has a lien on the proceeds only after the deduction of attorney's fees
and only to the extent of the total amount of compensation paid. The carrier
receives full reimbursement of all compensation paid without any deduction. 115
In no case, however, are attorney's fees apportioned between the employee
and the insurer.11 Where the amount is insufficient for both items the lien suffers,
but that is not because the lien is charged with the fee, but because the fee has
priority.
If the insurer brings the action, only two-thirds of the excess recovery goes
to the employee. Thus, the insurance carrier retains one-third of the excess.
Although this appears to be a windfall, this is presumably provided to encourage
the insurance company to do more than settle for merely the amount of the lien
plus its expenses.
In most cases the full amount of compensation due cannot be finally deter-
mined at the time of the action. Section 29(2) provides that in such case the
board shall estimate the probable total amount of such future benefits and "such
estimates shall be deemed the amount of the compensation awarded in such
case, for the purpose of computing the amount of such excess recovery ... "117
When the injured employee sues the third party, subsection 4 provides
that the carrier is liable only for the deficiency between the amount of recovery
actually collected and the compensation under the act. Thus, when the recovery
is less than the amount owed the claimant under the Workmen's Compensation
Law, the insurance carrier need only pay the difference. The combination of the
115. "It was clear intent of the legislature . . . that a reasonable attorney's fee
should be deducted from any recovery as a necessary expense in all instances, and that the
expression 'actually collected,' as used in subdivision 4 must now be construed to mean
the net amount collected after deduction of all reasonable and necessary expenses including
attorney's fees." Hobbs v. Dairymen's League Cooperative Ass'n, 258 A.D. 836, 837, 15
N.Y.S.2d 694, 695 (3d Dep't 1939), appeal denied, 282 N.Y. 710, 26 N.E.2d 823, 17 N.Y.S.2d
860 (1940). See also Curtin v. City of New York, 287 N.Y. 383, 39 N.E.2d 903, 29
N.Y.S.2d 153 (1942).
116. In Sarancza v. Roberts and Grancelli, Inc., 41 Misc. 2d 415, 245 N.Y.S.2d 403(Sup. Ct. 1963), the court stated that where there is enough to pay the compensation lien
in full even after making a reasonable allowance for attorney's fees there is no authority to
charge any of the fee to the lien. See also Kussack v. Ring Constr. Corp., 1 A.D.2d 634, 153
N.Y.S.2d 646 (3d Dep't 1956), aff'd, 4 N.Y.2d 1011, 152 N.E.2d 540, 177 N.Y.S.2d 522(1958). These two cases involved judgment recoveries, but voluntary settlements stand on
exactly the same footing under § 29.
117. Any excess paid to the employee serves as a credit against any future modification
of an award which increases the compensation due under the act. Similarly, if the award
is modified by ending or diminishing the compensation previously awarded, or in the event
that the future payment shall be less than the amount estimated by the board, the carrier
shall pay to the employee any amount of such excess recovery to -which the employee is
entitled by reason of such deficiency or modification. Thus, if the board overestimated the
amount of compensation owed by the carrier, the employee received a correspondingly de-
creased excess. The employee recovers this sum when the board finds it has overestimated
the costs.
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recovery and the difference will, of course, amount to the full liability under the
Workmen's Compensation Law.
The deficiency is computed after deduction of attorney's fees, rather than
before.118 Subtracting attorney's fees from the recovery in deficiency cases aids
the employee, since the result is a smaller net recovery. The employee then re-
ceives a larger deficiency judgment against the insurer.119 To base the deficiency
on the difference between the statutory liability and the gross recovery would
in effect charge the employee with attorney's fees, thus reducing his overall
recovery under tort and workmen's compensation. Yet, when the recovery
exceeds the compensation amount, the plaintiff-employee is charged with the
entire amount of attorney's fees.
Subsection 5 was amended in 1966 and refers to the payment of an award
to the Commissioner of Taxation and Finance in accordance with subdivision
8 and 9 of section 15, which established the special injury fund for previous
permanent disability, and section 25(a) for reopened cases. Such payment gives
the carrier liable for the award a cause of action for the amount of such payment
together with the reasonable funeral expenses and the expense of medical treat-
ment which shall be in addition to any cause of action for the representatives
of the deceased. Thus, a new cause of action is created and the carrier has had
to pay funds into the special injury fund or the reopened cases funds.
A compromise of any "such cause of action by the employee" at an amount
of less than the compensation provided for by the chapter shall be made only
with the written approval of the carrier.' 20 In the past the failure to get this
consent meant that the carrier had no more liability under the act. 21 Under a
recent amendment, written approval need not be obtained if the employee obtains
an order from the justice of the court in which the third party action is
obtained.' 22 The form of such petition to such court to compromise is set out
in a new subsection 5.m
118. See Ocean Steamship Co. v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. of Ill., 125 F.2d 925
(2d Cir. 1942).
119. Deficiency judgments in New York are discussed in Note, Deficiency Compensa-
tion under the Workmen's Compensation Law, 35 ST. JouN's L. PEv. 337 (1961).
120. The purpose of the consent provision was to prevent settlements which might
prejudice the rights of the carrier. See Meacham v. N.Y. Cent. R.R., 8 N.Y.2d 293,
169 N.E.2d 913, 206 N.Y.S.2d 569 (1960).
121. See discussion in NEw YORE STATE BAR Ass'Ix REPORT or SPECIAt Com iTTEE
A POTp_,D TO STUDY THE WORXZN[E'S COMPENSATION LAW 72 (1957). See Nachison v.
Phoenix of Hartford Ins. Co., 30 A.D.2d 499, 501-02, 294 N.Y.S. 2d 363, 365-67 (3d Dep't
1968); Clark v. Oakes & Burger Co., 16 A.D.2d 490, 491-92, 229 N.Y.S.2d 513, 514-16 (3d
Dep't 1962).
122. There is no requirement that the Workmen's Compensation Board determine the
insurer's liability prior to court approval of a settlement. Natchison v. Phoenix of Hartford
Ins. Co., 30 A.D.2d 499, 503, 294 N.Y.S.2d 363, 367-68 (3d Dep't 1968).
123. Even before the amendment the carrier was held to waive the requirement of
written consent by its participation in negotiations for a settlement, its consent to the
action, and its acceptance of a reduced recovery. See Timm v. June Rodgers Beauty Salon,
284 A.D. 1, 129 N.Y.S.2d 890 (3d Dep't 1954). See also Joint Legislative Committee on
Industrial and Labor Conditions, 1944-45, Legislative Document #69 (1955), published in
12 N.Y. LE0isTsATv DocumENT, 178 Session, at 94 (1956).
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
THE SUAPNG OF ATTORNEY'S FEES: A RESOLUTION
Concern with the apportionment of attorney's fees has usually stressed
the empty-handed, but successful, tort litigant. When the employee sues and
recovers from the third party, the deduction for attorney's fees and the in-
surer's lien may leave little, if anything, for the employee. Although many
instinctively feel that this result would be unfair, the possibility flows from the
creation of a statutory lien in the amount of compensation benefits. Yet, no
inherent unfairness seems to be present when the insurer is subrogated to the
rights of the employee. The rejection of the insurance analogy is so pervasive
that no change in this approach is foreseeable. If one were concerned with the
empty-handed employee, the creation of a statutory guarantee would provide
a solution.
Indeed, a number of states have provided for just such a share. As pointed
out above, however, the guarantee has no real operative effect when the re-
covery exceeds the sum of the attorney's fees, the lien, and the percentage
guarantee. Indeed, the one-third guarantee in Wisconsin, for example, is based
upon the net recovery, that is, total recovery less attorney's fees. Thus, the
only operative effect of the provision is to reduce the employer's lien where the
net recovery is less than sufficient to give the employee one-third of the recovery
and to give the insurer his lien. The critical case, paring further, would seem
to be one in which the net recovery is the same as or less than the lien. In this
case, under normal principles, the employee would find himself empty-handed
despite the successful prosecution of his negligence action.
It seems odd, however, to aid an employee whose third party recovery
barely exceeds his total amount of benefits. For, in these cases, the compen-
sation benefits and the jury's estimation of tort damages prove to be fairly
similar. The seemingly narrow application of this guarantee, however, may
simply be caused by the obvious fact that the employee who receives a relatively
large tort recovery does not really need a statutory guarantee.
Without empirical data, the incidence of empty-handed employees cannot
be known. Of course, they have received their statutory benefits even though
no excess may be obtained in the third party negligence action. Indeed, given
that statutory benefits compensate for only about one-third of the employee's
compensable loss, one might assume that tort awards would normally far exceed
statutory benefits.
Irrespective of the size of the third party recovery, however, the failure to
provide for apportionment is inequitable. Many states have assumed that it is
unfair to employee-plaintiffs to operate under the New York procedure. The
objection is probably not so much that the employee may find himself with
nothing, but rather that the insurer receives reimbursement without the out-
lay of attorney's fees. At the same time, the injured employee, the focus of
compensation and tort law, absorbs all of the attorney's fees. No matter how
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much the employee-plaintiff recovers, he has also recovered an amount for
the insurer at the employee's expense. More serious, of course, is the case where
attorney's fees and the lien consume all of the third party recovery.
The arguments for and against apportionment of attorney's fees are rel-
atively limited. It must be pointed out, however, that many relevant and
critical facts are not available. For instance, how many third party actions
are begun each year? By whom? How many actions are settled? In how many
cases does the insurer voluntarily reduce his lien? How many employees find
themselves with nothing remaining after statutory liens are deducted?124
Without an empirical investigation into these facts, any argument can
only be grounded upon speculative bases. The task is made additionally difficult
because the apportionment question may ultimately turn on perceived notions
of fairness and equity. There are, however, some guide posts from which an
objective analysis can be begun.
The workmen's compensation system, in essence, is based upon strict
liability for work-connected injuries. The remedy, as explained above, was
partial only, but prompt and partial restoration was deemed superior than
the unsatisfactory alternative of litigation. Rec~very of benefits is based not
on indemnity for injury as such, but rather, on the loss of earning capacity. 12
As mentioned earlier, the employee does not only receive less than would
be the case under negligence principles, but even loss of earning capacity is
restricted by percentages, weekly maximums, total maximums, and limitations
on duration. Furthermore, many elements of damages are not compensable
under workmen's compensation statutes. Many states do not reimburse for
loss of hearing or for physical or mental pain and suffering unless it in some
way interferes with the earning capacity of the injured employee. Some states
do not compensate for the loss of child bearing capacity by women or for
impotency. Nor is there reimbursement generally for loss of consortium by a
husband or wife. There is normally no provision for exemplary damages, no
recovery for the loss of a minor's services, and in many states there is no
recovery for a non-disabling injury or partial disability which does not result
in the loss of wages.
Furthermore, if the worker employs legal counsel in securing his compen-
sation benefits, his attorney's fees are made a lien on the recovery.12 0 New
124. Correspondence from the California Dept. of Insurance and the New Jersey
Division of Workmen's Compensation indicates that carriers voluntarily reduce liens in
the interest of settlement when third party liability is questionable, although data is not
available, and little is actually known about the incidence of and recoveries in third party
actions.
125. See Marhoffer v. Marhoffer, 220 N.Y. 543, 116 N.E. 379, 159 N.Y.S. 751 (1917);
N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'x REPORT, supra note 121, at 72 (1957).
126. Other states provide that the employer shall pay the attorney's fees in addition
to the amount of the award. In others the employer is liable for payment of the fee only
in the event that it is found that the claim has been unreasonably contested. See N.Y. STATE
BAR Ass'N REPoRT, supra note 121, at 101. The committee points out that in negligence
cases the fee comes out of the recovery and there would appear to be no valid reason
for creating a different scheme under the workmen's compensation act. This statement over-
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York and a number of other states require, however, that no claim for legal
services will be valid or enforceable unless it is fixed and approved by an
administrative agency or court. 2 7 In practically all jurisdictions, some power
has been vested in state agencies to control attorneys' fees. Only 29 jurisdic-
tions, however, provide mandatory control. In other states the power to control
rests upon the request of either party, a controversy arising, or agency discretion
to require the parties to act. The New York Workmen's Compensation Board,
acting through referees, fixes the amount of the fee, 128 but it is deemed a lien
on the award and it is deducted from the recovery. 12 9
As Professor Witte has explained, the compensation system does not place
the full cost of industrial accidents on employers. Employers bear part of the
cost, irrespective of fault, because we assume they can better bear the cost and,
perhaps, can pass on the cost to consumers of their products or services. Thus,
when we consider allocation of attorney's fees, traditional subrogation doctrines
should not blind us to the actual operation of the system. Since the burden of
industrial accidents is shared between employee and employer the question then
becomes: should attorney's fees be allocated between the plaintiff-employee and
the insurer, and, if so, how should it be done?
Sharing of fees is not inconsistent with compensation principles. Indeed,
it would be consistent with the traditional principle of compensating injured
employees. As referred to above, this principle, along with the acknowledged
inadequacy of compensation benefits, has justified the retention of third-party
actions in the first place. One of the sole references to this question in New
York literature overlooks this point.
In 1955 Assemblyman Morgan introduced a bill which would have limited
the compensation carrier's lien to two-thirds of the net recovery after deduction
of expenses including attorney's fees, and authorized approval of a settlement
looks the fact that juries might well consider the attorney's fee in rendering an award.
Under the workmen's compensation law, however, the effect of maximum amounts and
scheduled benefits is that there is very little play in the amount of the benefits received
or awarded to the claimant. See discussion of attorney's fees, id. at 100-03.
127. See, A REPORT or =E STANDARDs AwD PRocEDuRs IN STATE LEGISLATION, Bulletin
220, U.S. Dept. of Labor (1960).
128. In New York all fees are approved by the board in an amount commensurate
with the services rendered, with due regard for the financial status of the claimant, and in
no case based solely on the amount of the award. This latter point is significant since in
many instances the awards are for a sum which might in any event have been paid in part
without contest. The recovery as to which there was a controversy may be for a nominal
amount, whereas the face of the award may call for a substantial amount. The full award,
therefore, is not a proper measure upon which to base the fee. In addition, in view of the
social objectives served by these laws, it could be argued that remuneration for services of
attorneys should properly be smaller than in commercial cases or in ordinary negligence
actions in the civil courts. See Allen, Fixing of Attorney's Fees by the Industrial Accident
Commission, 7 CALIF. STATE BAR J. 234 (1932); In re Fisch, 188 App. Div. 525, 177 N.Y.S.
338 (1st Dep't 1919).
129. Three states, Washington, Oregon, and North Dakota, provide for payment of
attorney's fees either by the compensation agency or from the industrial accident fund.
Assuming widespread knowledge of such payments, one would expect employees to be
motivated to bring negligence actions knowing they will be relieved of the burden of legal
costs.
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by the court in which the action is pending if voluntary approval of the carrier
was refused. 180 The Morgan bill would not have apportioned attorneys' fees,
but rather, would have limited the recovery of the lien to two-thirds. This is
similar in result to the Wisconsin approach which guarantees the employee
one-third of the net recovery. The New York State Bar Committee rejected the
idea of reducing the carrier's lien as being
based on a misconception of the purpose of the third party actions.
Provision for these actions was included in the act for the purpose
of giving the employee an opportunity to collect an amount in excess
of the benefits payable under the law. While the provision reducing
the carrier's lien was intended to facilitate settlements by giving the
injured employee a greater share of the third party recovery, never-
theless there is no logical justification for reducing the carrier's lien.
Such a provision would increase the cost of Workmen's Compensation
because of the obvious fact that the liability of the compensation
carriers is increased in proportion to the decrease in the amount of
reimbursements they obtain out of third party settlements.",'
The Committee's objections to a proposal to reduce the lien would probably
be applicable to apportionment of attorney's fees. Any reduction in reimburse-
ments by carriers may increase the cost of workmen's compensation. The Com-
mittee went further to say that the reduction would increase the insurer's
liability. This is not readily apparent, since the liability under compensation
acts can only be reduced by the institution of third party actions. It is inaccu-
rate to say that recovery of the lien reduces the carrier's liability; rather, it
reimburses the carrier for its satisfaction of its statutory liability. It is true,
of course, that allocation of fees reduces the amount of reimbursement and,
thereby, reduces the industrial accident fund. Moreover, the carrier's lien is
characterized by section 29 as being for the benefit of the fund.
To call this an increase in the carrier's net liability, however, is merely
to play with words. A compensation carrier has no inherent right of subro-
gation, and in two states, carriers have no such right. If the carrier sues in
New York, it receives a windfall in that it receives one-third of the recovery.
Although created in the hopes that the carrier will seek more than the amount
of its lien, and thereby create an "excess" for the employee, the amount is
nevertheless a windfall. That is, this amount adds to the accident fund but is
not based on any concurrent liability. The "loss" suffered by the apportion-
ment of attorney's fees can be considered as balancing this windfall.
More important, perhaps, is the fact that the insurer receives one-third
of the excess as an inducement to settle for more than its statutory liability.
This provision demonstrates that pure subrogation doctrine has been modified
for certain perceived social goals. The benefit to the insurer, however, is
130. N.Y. Assembly Bill Int. 198, Pr. 198. See recent amendments to N.Y, WonxIIEN's
Colo. LAW § 29(5) (1965).
131. N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'" REPoRT, supra note 121, at 73-74.
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secured at the employee's expense. Thus, traditional subrogation notions alone
cannot be used to dismiss a proposal to allocate attorney's fees proportionately.
It is also insufficient to argue that apportionment of fees will increase the
cost of compensation. First, carriers receive a windfall in the one-third excess
recovery which lessens compensation cost. More importantly, the cost argu-
ment is misleading for it assumes that the bearing of a proportionate share
of attorney's fees is not a proper cost for insurers who recover compensation
costs from a third party. Yet this is the very question at issue. When the
insurer acts as plaintiff, he deducts attorney's fees and then withdraws his lien
from the recovery. Assuming the recovery is sufficient to pay legal fees and
reimburse the carrier, the carrier has received his full lien and, in addition,
has been reimbursed for his legal expenses. 132 Yet, when the employee sues,
the statute requires the employee to bear the entire cost of attorney's fees. This
anomaly is inequitable given the strong, statutorally-caused inducement for em-
ployees to sue.
The objection often raised, that innovation will increase the cost of doing
business in New York and place the state in a disadvantaged competitive
position, will be difficult to support. Initially, as pointed out before, nearly
all of the heavily industrialized states already provide for some form of appor-
tionment or statutory guarantee. Moreover, benefit rates in New York are not
significantly greater than in these states. An unfortunate obstacle to cost de-
termination is the general lack of data about third party actions as well as
the difficulty of tracing costs to statutory changes. Since changes in benefits
and coverage occur with some regularity, it will be exceedingly difficult to
relate the effect of an apportionment scheme to premium rates for compensa-
tion insurance.233
It is only because the injury is caused by the negligence of the third party
that the insurance carrier recoups any of its liability in the first place. Indeed,
it is not forced to sue, and therefore the cost the public pays depends on the
private decision of an insurance firm. The fact that the claimant recovers
more under the Morgan proposal is not astounding, since the very purpose of
giving him a third party claim is so that he may recover more than he could
under workmen's compensation. Since the number of third party claims might
be very small, the added costs to the insurance scheme may well be very small
when apportioned over the large number of firms in the state. Its difference to
the injured employee, however, may be great. Indeed, the Committee's approach
ignores a contrary public policy to compensate injured persons. In the tort
action, the employee may be left with nothing after the attorney's fees and
132. When the insurer's attorneys are employees, this reimbursement should, in effect,
further reduce the carrier's liability. The effect may be the same under certain types of
retainer agreements.
133. Letter from Illinois Department of Insurance to N.Y. State Law Revision Com-
mission.
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lien are subtracted, although he has still received his statutory benefits. 8 4
If this is the case, then the insurance carrier has received a windfall in that it
has received funds, albeit a recoupment of prior expenses, without having to
incur the normal expenses.13 5 In other words, the claimant has paid in order
to reimburse the insurance firm. Such a result is not required by any policy
under the Workmen's Compensation Law or the law of torts in New York.
Finally, it should be remembered that employees are strongly encouraged
to bring actions against third parties before the cause of action is assigned to
the insurer. Not only might the employee want to protect his own interests
but, should an assignment occur, the carrier receives one-third of the excess.
Thus, the act encourages the employee to sue, even though the result is that
he bears the collection fees for the insurer's reimbursement. Furthermore, if the
settlement figure will merely reimburse the workmen's compensation carrier,
the employee may have no real alternative but to prosecute his tort cause of
action.' 36 Thus, in a real sense, the employee has no real choice. If his case
seems meritorious, the very provisions of the act encourage him to prosecute
his third party claim. Yet, if the employee receives a settlement or recovery, the
insurer is reimbursed without sharing in the necessary legal expenses. Thus,
the statute subsidizes carriers by a structure which permits them to recover
statutory expenses without incurring legal fees. Since an important motivation
to sue is to avoid the statutory windfall to the insurer, it seems highly inequi-
table to make the employee bear the entire legal expenses involved in securing
a recovery.
134. Attorney's fees in the tort action will normally be greater than fees involved in
securing compensation. Investigations by plaintiff's attorney will have to be different and
more rigorous in nature than in the workmen's compensation proceeding. Entirely new and
complex questions are presented, such as proximate causation, contributory negligence, and
questions of damages. The case will probably be tried before a jury. Greater attention must
be given to the statements of witnesses, medical witnesses, and the background of the client.
Formal pleadings are prepared, motions made, congested calendars faced, witnesses examined
and cross-examined, exceptions to court rulings are raised, and points of law are argued.
Furthermore, in compensation cases before administrative agencies, the notice of injury and
claim for compensation forms are simplified and standardized, consultive service with agency
officials is readily available, informal procedures often insure against the loss of a case
by reason of technical mistakes in presentation, the ordinary rules of evidence are often
not binding, the reports of the employer, agents, and agency investigatory staff are made
available, findings, awards and decisions are generally drafted by the agencies, and calendars
often reduce waiting time for trial to a minimum, thereby enabling attorneys to appear at
several hearings in one day. These considerations narrow the scope of the attorney's
functions and materially reduce the amount of services performed. See McDonald, Third
Party Liability in Workmen's Compensation Cases in Workmen's Compensation Problems,
IAIBC PROCEED-TGS, 1962, vol. 254, U.S. Dept. of Labor, 4243.
135. See Separate Report by Jeannette M. Harris, N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'" REPORT,
supra note 121, at 116. Miss Harris argues that the claimant-plaintiff must pay out of his
share all of the fees and disbursements required to collect the compensation carrier's lien.
The Morgan ball was basically an attempt to charge the carrier's lien with the legal fee
and this is why the lien was reduced by one-third. It might be pointed out, however, that
such is a very arbitrary attempt to allocate legal fees. A better approach would be to leave
it to the court to decide an appropriate distribution.
136. See Ford, The Liability of Nonemployer Tortfeasors Under State Workmen's
Compensation Statutes: A Choice of Law Problem, 68 YA E L.J. 54 (1958).
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CONCLUSION
Based on the previous discussion, section 29 of the Workmen's Compen-
sation Law should be amended to provide for the apportionment of attorney's
fees incurred by an employee in his third party action.
A precise statutory formula provides the advantage of certainty and
narrows the range of a trial judge's discretion. Predictability is of limited value,
however, since the attorney's fee will often not be determined until a recovery
is obtained or a settlement is reached. Equitable apportionment will often
depend upon the ratio of the insurer's lien to the recovery, and this amount
will also not be determinable until the action is resolved.
Moreover, it seems wise to permit flexibility in apportioning fees upon
equitable considerations. Although most courts would normally apportion fees
based on the ratio of the lien to the net recovery, it seems appropriate to pro-
vide judicial flexibility in extraordinary cases. A number of variables exist and
suggest that a case by case approach is appropriate: the relative cost of at-
torney's fees, the size of the recovery and its relation to compensation benefits,
and the assistance rendered by the insurer in the third party action should all
be considered by the court in determining an equitable apportionment. These
variables might be listed in the provision itself so that judges could have some
guidelines in apportioning fees.
Whether the action is finally determined by jury verdict or settlement,
the plaintiff-employee should be permitted to move for judicial apportionment.
The motion would then lead to a hearing at which the employee and the insurer
would be present.

